

Indo-US Strategic Convergence: Implications for South Asia

Sabiha Mehreen and Iraj Abid*

Abstract

The United States (US) dominance in the current global order has been challenged by China's economic rise in the twenty-first century. The US has always sought allies and strategic partners in different regions to counter any threats it faces globally. In South Asia, the US has partnered with India to counter the rising influence of China in Asia-Pacific (APAC) region and to maintain its dominant status in the world. This strategic convergence has two-fold implications: (i) Fuelling the great-power rivalry; and (ii) Creating strategic instability in the region, as it is one of the theatres of conflicts between the great powers. This, in turn, diminishes the prospects of peace in South Asia and increases the risk of conflict escalation between the two nuclear-armed rivals in South Asia – Pakistan and India. The paper examines the evolution and nature of Indo-US strategic convergence in the twenty-first century and its impact on strategic stability in South Asia.

Keywords

Indo-US, South Asia, Strategic Partnership, Strategic Stability, Global Order, Asia-Pacific

Introduction

To maintain its preponderance in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region, Washington has designed a toolbox containing strategies for hedging against rising Beijing power, such as; the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the QUAD and AUKUS partnerships.

In the APAC region, Washington is strengthening its relations with New Delhi. This trend specifically gained momentum in the twenty-first century, where the US and India have signed four foundational agreements: (i) General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA); (ii) Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA); (iii) Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA);

* Sabiha Mehreen and Iraj Abid are Research Officers at Center for International Strategic Studies Sindh (CISSS), Karachi.

and (iv) Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), as well as several other defence and trade agreements. The Indo-US relations now operate within the structural framework of the bilateral strategic partnership rather than an alliance.¹ Compared to alliances, strategic partnerships are a loose form of alignment involving a less binding commitment.² Most developing states choose this kind of “limited alignment” as it offers benefits without loss of autonomy.³

The Indo-US relationship is more of a marriage of convenience where the US believes that India, due to its large area, and economy, has the potential to actualise the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy. The US National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Trump administration in 2017, used the term Indo-Pacific in place of Asia-Pacific, which was a part of US strategy to announce that Indian Ocean was also its arena of interest. Moreover, in May 2018, the Trump administration extended the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) to include area up to the western border of India and renamed it as US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).⁴ This shift was orchestrated in order to deal with the rising threats emanating from China and assigning the role of “net security provider”⁵ in the region to India.

India views its partnership with the US as an opportunity to pursue its strategic interests in the region and beyond. This is a major development that threatens peace and stability in Asia because the region has the largest number of Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) – China, Russia, Pakistan, India and North Korea. Each of them shares border with at least one other NWS.

The current Indo-US strategic partnership also seeks to change the security architecture of South Asia. The two South Asian NWS share 75-years’ history of bitter and hostile relations, having fought three major wars and numerous border skirmishes. Massive Indian arms build-up, and growing asymmetry between conventional forces of India and Pakistan is adversely affecting strategic balance in South Asia. According to the data released by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2022, India spent around USD 76.6 billion on its defence in 2021. It is the world’s largest importer of major arms accounting for 11 per cent of total global arms imports in the last five years (2017-21).⁶ Figure 1 illustrates upward trend in Indian military expenditure over the last decade.⁷ Given India’s increasing strategic convergence with the US, Pakistan strives for

restoring the strategic balance and maintaining peace in the region, without entering into an arms race.

Figure 1: Indian Military Expenditure (current USD) 2012-2021



Indo-US Relations during the Cold War

During the cold war, the relationship between India and the US remained at low key owing to their divergent views over the US rivalry with the USSR and socialist tendencies of early Indian leaders such as Nehru. Despite India's officially declared policy of non-alignment (1961), New Delhi and Moscow signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation in 1971, where the two countries pledged to cooperate in fields of economy, science and technology.⁸ According to article IX of the Treaty, the two parties also undertook to abstain from providing any assistance to a third party against each other. It further states that they agreed that in the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, they shall enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take

appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries.⁹

Owing to India's close relations with the erstwhile Soviet Union, it had cold and at times even hostile relations with the US during most of the cold war years.¹⁰ The US viewed India posing a "two-fold threat": (i) challenging the US containment policy against the USSR; and (ii) aiming to destroy Pakistan, a key US ally during the Cold War.¹¹

The issue of nuclear proliferation also remained a major irritant in the Indo-US relations. In May 1974, India carried out its so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) at Pokhran. The US considered this opposed to the non-proliferation efforts. In response to Indian test, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established in 1975 to regulate nuclear related exports and imports with an objective to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons.¹² Ironically, in 2005, the US signed a nuclear deal with India. For executing the deal Bush administration lobbied for India's NSG waiver in 2008.

Commenting on India's non-alignment status, US President Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that the "neutralism was an immoral and short-sighted conception".¹³ However, despite divergent views about the communist threat, the US tried to maintain a working relationship with India because of its large size and regional importance. This was evident from the development aid provided by the US to India during the cold war years.¹⁴ Moreover, during 1962 Sino-Indian war, the US also provided military aid to India, which was accepted by India under what can be called as a "military reliance if not military alliance".¹⁵

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of cold war, new geopolitical realities began to emerge resulting in the reassessment of past alliances. In the mid-1990s, common political interests brought the US and India closer.¹⁶ Washington started viewing New Delhi as a significant Asian power. Simultaneously, liberalisation of Indian economy and globalisation also acted as a source of convergence between the two countries.¹⁷

The five Indian nuclear explosions in May 1998 strained the relations between the US and India. Pakistan responded with six successful nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May 1998. Sanctions were imposed on both India and Pakistan through the Glenn Amendments as a consequence of the nuclear

tests. However, many sanctions were removed from India in 1999 due to its powerful economic lobby in the US.¹⁸ Subsequently, fourteen rounds of Jaswant Singh (Indian Minister of External Affairs)/Strobe Talbott (US Deputy Secretary of State) discussions were held (1998-2000) on security, non-proliferation, disarmament and other global issues.¹⁹ However, commercial and economic interests outweighed the global nuclear proliferation concerns as the US-India talks led to a process that culminated in the signing of Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal in 2005.

Regional Implications of Indo-US Strategic Partnership

Former US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robert Blake commenting on the emerging geopolitical situations stated that there has been a shift from “a transatlantic century to a transpacific century, in which the rise of Asia has already started to define the twenty-first century.”²⁰ The rising geopolitical and geo-economic tension between the US and China, has created greater space for strategic cooperation between Washington and New Delhi.²¹

The strategic convergence between the US and India started to take shape in the post-September 11, 2001 years and has since transformed into a strategic partnership. Under the Bush administration, Indo-US bilateral defence ties were strengthened and military to military exchanges were initiated. India became a valuable US ally in Asia. Washington viewed this strategic convergence as a useful counterweight to China.²² Since then, the bilateral relationship between India and the US has gradually transformed into a comprehensive strategic partnership covering multiple domains including trade, technology and defence.²³

Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal: The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal, signed in 2005, is a major pillar of the strategic partnership between the two countries as it unofficially recognised India as a *de facto* NWS and removed technological restrictions on India thereby allowing it to have access to sophisticated nuclear technologies.²⁴ The Deal continues to undermine the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

NSG Waiver for India: In 2008, India was granted a US-sponsored NSG waiver that enabled it to engage in trade of nuclear material and technology with the world. The waiver was a continuation of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal.²⁵ Under this deal, despite being a non-NPT state, India

is enjoying the privileges of a NSG state and is able to receive nuclear material and technology from NSG member states. It is also able to use its indigenous stocks and divert imported fissile material for production of nuclear weapons.²⁶ Currently, eight nuclear reactors of India are outside IAEA safeguards. The waiver has enabled India to negotiate agreements on nuclear cooperation with various countries, including the US, France, Canada, Russia, Australia, South Korea, Japan, and a few others.²⁷

The US also wants India to become a member of NSG despite it being a non-NPT state. Pakistan has also applied for the NSG membership owing to the fact that it has the same credentials as India and has been insisting on a non-discriminatory criteria-based approach. If a discriminatory approach is pursued with respect to the Indian bid for the NSG membership, it would increase instability in South Asia and disturb the global peace and security.

The US Pivot to Asia: In 2012, the Obama administration announced its “rebalancing” or “Pivot to Asia” policy that emphasised Indian role in the APAC. Elaborating the Pivot to Asia, the former US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton wrote, “Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the Atlantic.”²⁸ It is argued that the US “Pivot” policy was aimed at making India a regional economic anchor and a security provider in the so-called Indo-Pacific region.²⁹ The US “Pivot” policy was complementary to India’s “Look East” policy³⁰ which was adopted to increase economic integration with South East Asian states. India renamed it as “Act East” policy and expanded its area of focus to strengthening ties with East Asia in 2014. The convergence of interests between India and the US, mainly to contain China through curbing its influence in the ASEAN region,³¹ further enhanced Indo-US defence partnership.

Foundational Agreements between the US and India: In 2002, the US and India signed their first foundational agreement titled General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) which enabled the sharing of classified military information between the two countries. The two countries signed the extension of GSOMIA in 2019, titled “Industrial Security Annex (ISA)” which enabled the US to share classified information and technology with private Indian defence corporations.³² In 2016, the US and India signed Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)

that allowed forces of the two countries to use each other's military bases by for reinforcements, supplies and carrying out mechanical repairs.³³ The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) was signed in 2018 which permitted both countries to share secure communication and exchange information during training exercises and operations.³⁴ Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), signed in 2020, further strengthened the Indo-US strategic cooperation, providing India access to real time sensitive information through US geospatial intelligence.³⁵ It allows the exchange of both unclassified and controlled unclassified geospatial products, topographical, nautical, and aeronautical data, products and services between India and the US.³⁶

The Indo-US strategic cooperation under these foundational agreements provides India a strategic edge over Pakistan. Therefore, it has the potential to destabilise the region and adversely impact strategic stability of South Asia.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy: The US Indo-Pacific strategy, which aims to promote security ties among “like-minded partners” in the region and beyond,³⁷ is based on the shared concerns of the US and India related to China's growing geopolitical and geo-economic influence globally. It was first announced by Trump administration to consolidate and expand the US network of partnerships to contain China in the APAC. The US Strategy assigned the role of “net security provider” in the region to India.³⁸

However, the National Security Committee of Pakistan, in its meeting on 24 August 2017, rejected the US assertion, stating that “India cannot be a net security provider in the region when it has conflictual relationships with all its neighbours and is pursuing a policy of destabilising Pakistan.”³⁹ Islamabad has consistently maintained that New Delhi played a role of a spoiler in Afghanistan and used Afghan territory for fomenting terrorism in Pakistan during two decades of NATO presence in the country.

STA-1 Status to India: In 2018, India became the third Asian and the only South Asian state which was given the Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 (STA-1) status by the US. This status allows the sale of state-of-the-art military equipment to India without fulfilling license requirements.⁴⁰ The US grants STA-1 status to only close allies which are members of the four export control regimes including Australia Group (AG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG).⁴¹ However, the US granted STA-1 Status to India, despite its non-member status of the NSG.

The STA-1 status of India contributes to intensifying regional security dilemma. Pakistan would have to take necessary measures to restore the strategic balance in South Asia. The US strategy to prop up India has emboldened it to adopt an aggressive posture in the region and resort to brinkmanship, threatening peace and strategic stability in the region.

The US-India Joint Military Exercises: According to the US Secretary of Air Force Frank Kendall, the US holds more joint exercises with India than with any other country.⁴² This can be traced back to the 1992 Indo-US joint naval exercise along the Malabar Coast, which was subsequently joined by Australia and Japan in 2007. India has also been participating in the world's largest US-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise since 2014. The two countries conducted their first ever tri-service military exercises namely Tiger Triumph in November 2019.⁴³ Moreover, in March 2022, the US for the first time participated in the multilateral Milan naval exercise, hosted by Indian Navy. Among the bilateral Indo-US joint military exercises are the Yudh Abhyas (2002), the Cope India air exercise (2004) and the Vajra Prahar army exercises (2010). These joint military exercises in all three services pose a greater security threat to the region and beyond.

Bilateral Defence Trade: Defence trade is a major component of the Indo-US strategic partnership that continues to expand as a result of “major defence partner” status accorded by the US to India in 2016. According to the US Department of State (2021), the defence trade between the US and India increased to USD 20 billion in 2020 from nearly zero in 2008.⁴⁴ Moreover, multiple defence agreements, such as the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (2012), have been signed between the two countries that allow India to co-produce advanced weapon systems, using sophisticated military technology, with the US.⁴⁵ These technologies and weapon systems will enable India to conduct covert intelligence-gathering operations against Pakistan. In case of any crisis, especially in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), India will be in a position to receive real-time information with the US assistance.

2+2 Ministerial Dialogue: In continuation of the growing strategic convergence, India and the US held their first 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in 2018. Both sides called the dialogue a “reflection of the shared

commitment” wherein the two countries reaffirmed their strategic cooperation in defence, security and technology in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. The first dialogue was followed by three subsequent 2+2 dialogues in 2019, 2020 and 2022, in which increasing strategic cooperation was discussed in addition to strengthening people-to-people ties. The US and India continued to reaffirm their cooperation on the US policy of Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

The joint statement of the fourth US-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, held on 11 April, 2022, reflects reaffirmation from both the countries for building an advanced and comprehensive bilateral defence partnership. It acknowledged the importance of extending collaboration in emerging defense domains including artificial intelligence (AI), space and cyber.⁴⁶

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the US, India, Japan and Australia is a significant dimension of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. It was initiated in 2007 as an informal group proclaiming its commitment to a free, open, inclusive, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific.⁴⁷ The idea did not make much headway in 2008 due to protests from Beijing which perceived it as an Asian NATO aimed at containing China⁴⁸ but Quad was revived in November 2017 on the side lines of the 31st ASEAN Summit.

The Quad focuses on the Indo-Pacific region which is a major global trade and energy supply route, with 60 per cent of maritime trade passing through it.⁴⁹ In 2019, the US trade worth USD 1.9 trillion passed through this region,⁵⁰ which underscores the region’s geostrategic significance for the US.

The US Economic Dependence on China: Despite its desire and intentions to contain China, the US is restrained by its own economic interests vis-à-vis China. The US-China relationship is marked by complex interdependence that has developed over decades. Although, the US administrations and China try to limit their dependence on each other yet robust trade and investment ties exist between the two countries. In 2020, Beijing was US’ largest trading partner, the biggest source of imports and third largest market for the US exports.⁵¹ In 2019, around 1.2 million American jobs depended on exports to China. Despite the US-initiated trade war between the US and China, the current balance of their bilateral trade is heavily in favour of China.⁵²

In order to maintain international peace and security, the US has to cooperate with China which is a global power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Irrespective of the efforts of the US and other western countries to prop up India, its significance at the global level pales in comparison to China.

India's Aggressive Posture in the Region

The Indo-US partnership adversely impacts strategic stability in South Asia. India ranks among world's top arms importers, with Russia and the US as its leading suppliers of military hardware. This adds to the conventional imbalance between Pakistan and India which has existed since their inception.

India claims that it is faced with a two-front war threat from Pakistan and China. India in fact uses this exaggerated threat to its security to extract political and military favours from the west for its arms build-up, as the narrative also fits into the calculus of western powers. India's Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) against Pakistan was also designed keeping in view the larger ambitions of dominating the region through rapid mobilisation of troops and combat readiness. Moreover, India modified its nuclear doctrine from 'Credible Minimum Deterrence' to 'Minimum Deterrence' and mentioned the use of 'surgical strikes' as a formal tool of retaliation in Joint Services Doctrine 2017.⁵³ This was supplemented by 2018 Land Warfare Doctrine in which the role of emerging technologies in future warfare was discussed, which highlighted India's growing quest for military modernisation, heavy import and indigenous production of weaponry.⁵⁴ All of this endangers the regional strategic stability and disturbs the existing state of nuclear deterrence.

In addition to the above, India's aggressive posture also includes its military misadventurism through the so-called 'surgical strikes' inside Pakistan's territory and its illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir. On 26 February 2019, Indian Air force (IAF) planes violated Pakistan's airspace and dropped their payload in Balakot area. It was the first ever incident of aggression by one NWS against another NWS. The incident was also a glaring example of India's behaviour as an irresponsible NWS.

Kashmir continues to be a nuclear flashpoint in South Asia due to India's aggressive posture and has been a cause of three major wars between

Pakistan and India. On 5 August 2019, the incumbent Indian BJP government illegally changed the special status of Occupied Jammu and Kashmir, by splitting and incorporating it as two separate union territories - Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh, by suspending article 370 and article 35A of the Indian constitution.

Pakistan's Role in Maintaining Strategic Balance in South Asia

Despite several factors adversely impacting the strategic stability in South Asia, Pakistan's nuclear capability has proved to be a factor of stability in the region. Pakistan's doctrine of Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) achieved in line with its policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence guarantees Pakistan's national security as well as peace and stability in the region. In addition FSD has also effectively neutralised Indian conventional military advantage.

Former Director General Strategic Plans Division (DG SPD) Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai (R) in a conference stated that, "In the strategic stability-instability paradigm of South Asia, it has become Pakistan's responsibility to ensure that strategic stability will not be disturbed to Pakistan's disadvantage at any stage despite India's consistent efforts to swing the pendulum towards instability." He also cautioned India "not to consider Pakistan's robust nuclear capability as a bluff, and if an irresponsible military adventure were to be undertaken, Pakistan will respond forcefully under its retaliatory doctrine of Quid Pro Quo Plus."⁵⁵

Fault lines in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership

India-China Economic Relations: Despite border disputes, India-China bilateral trade continues to grow. It was USD 125 billion in 2021, making Beijing the largest trade partner of New Delhi. The US stood at second place with USD 113 billion trade with India.⁵⁶ The current India-China trade relations hamper India's role as a reliable US strategic partner and a dependable Quad member.

The Russia Factor: Due to Russia's resurgence as a global power, the world order is undergoing transformation. Food and energy security have begun to impact the strategic calculus of many countries around the world. This is evident from the fact that despite its strategic partnership with the US, India has declined to tow the Western line on Ukraine conflict. This is

largely because India and Russia share bilateral relations since the Cold War era. Furthermore, India continues to heavily rely on Russian arms and weaponry. Russia was the largest supplier of major arms to India in the last decade (2012–21).⁵⁷

More recently, India has been purchasing Russian oil on discounted price despite the US pressure to the contrary. The US criticism of situation of religious freedom in India in a recently published report is part of the US pressure tactics in order to oblige New Delhi to follow the Washington's line over the Ukraine issue.⁵⁸ Notably, the US senior officials have also criticised India's human rights abuses.

India – An Outlier in Quad: India is seen by many as an outlier in the Quad. In case of direct confrontation with China, India will not be able to bear military and economic costs, therefore, it seems to avoid provoking Beijing.⁵⁹ For instance, the Indo-China violent skirmishes in Galwan Valley (2020), where India lost twenty soldiers, exposed India's inability to effectively respond to even small-scale border conflicts with China. Moreover, India lacks naval power projection capabilities in the South China Sea. These weaknesses raise serious questions about India's will and ability to achieve the Quad objective of China's containment.

AUKUS is a security partnership between the US, the UK, and Australia aiming to assist Australia in developing and deploying nuclear-powered submarines and joint research and development of Hypersonic Missiles.⁶⁰ Although, AUKUS does not name China, the arrangement is aimed at containing China in the region. India, despite being a Quad partner, is excluded from AUKUS, creating internal divisions and resentment among the strategic thinkers of India.⁶¹

For India, the alternate option is that of cooperation with its neighbouring countries. A Stimson study on *Crisis and Consequences in Southern Asia* states that in the context of Quad, India should have good relations with its neighbours – Pakistan and China – rather than opting for hostile relations on its both fronts.⁶²

Conclusion

In the twenty-first century, the Indo-US relationship has gradually transformed into a bilateral strategic partnership, where the US is aligning

with India to contain China. To achieve this larger strategic goal Washington is supporting New Delhi in developing and modernising its conventional and nuclear capabilities, hence, helping India into becoming a regional hegemon.

The US has overlooked non-proliferation concerns and gone out of its way to seek favours for India, in particular from NSG.

Despite Indo-US strategic partnership, there are fault lines that can adversely impact US-India bilateral relations in view of rapidly changing world order.

There are question marks about India's role as a reliable Quad partner in achieving its objective of containing China, given India's interests vis-à-vis China.

India's aggressive posture in the region, as evident from the Balakot incident, intrusion attempts by Indian submarines in Pakistan's territorial waters, its refusal to peacefully resolve the outstanding disputes with Pakistan including Kashmir and India's counterforce temptations, continue to impact strategic stability in the region and pose a threat to regional and international peace and stability. It also diminishes prospects for regional cooperation. Common challenges posed by non-traditional security threats, such as climate change, remain unattended due to India's hostile posture in the region.

Owing to India's massive arms acquisition drive, Pakistan is compelled to take measures to restore the regional strategic balance and its nuclear program is a factor of stability in South Asia as Pakistan will never accept India as a net security provider in the region.

Endnotes

¹ Parameswaran, Prashanth. 2014. "Explaining US Strategic Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific Region: Origins, Developments and Prospects." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 36 (2): 262. <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs36-2d>.

² Ibid.

³ Ciorciari (quoted in Parameswaran, 2014)

⁴ "About United States Indo-Pacific Command," [Www.pacom.mil](http://www.pacom.mil), <https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/>.

⁵ The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf>

⁶ “World Military Expenditure Passes \$2 Trillion for First Time | SIPRI.” www.sipri.org Accessed June 7, 2022. [https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time#:~:text=\(Stockholm%2C%2025%20April%202022\)](https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time#:~:text=(Stockholm%2C%2025%20April%202022))

⁷ “Military Expenditure (Current USD) - India | Data.” n.d. Data.worldbank.org. Accessed June 15, 2022. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?end=2020&locations=IN&start=2012>

⁸ “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-Operation,” Ministry of External Affairs, <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5139/Treaty+of>

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Kux, Dennis, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. 2002. *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941-1991*. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific.

¹¹ Hayes, Jarrod. 2012. “Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security: Nixon, India, and the Ties That Bind.” *International Organization* 66 (1): 63–93. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818311000324>

¹² Abbasi, Rizwana, and Khan, Zafar. 2020. *NUCLEAR DETERRENCE in SOUTH ASIA: New Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace*. S.L.: Routledge.

¹³ Kux, Dennis, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. 2002. *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States: 1941-1991*.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell. 2006. *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More than Words*. London; New York: Routledge Printing.

¹⁸ Abbasi, Rizwana, and Khan, Zafar. 2020. *NUCLEAR DETERRENCE in SOUTH ASIA: New Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace*. S.L.: Routledge.

¹⁹ “Embassy of India, Washington D C, USA.” n.d. Indianembassyusa.gov.in. <https://indianembassyusa.gov.in/ArchivesDetails?id=239>

²⁰ Chacko, Priya. “A New ‘Special Relationship’: Power Transitions, Ontological Security, and India–US Relations.” *International Studies Perspectives* 15, no. 3 (2014): 329–46. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44218758>

²¹ Tellis, Ashley J. “Narendra Modi and U.S.–India Relations.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. November 21, 2018. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/01/narendra-modi-and-u.s.-india-relations-pub-77861>

²² Abbasi, Rizwana, and Khan, Zafar. 2020. *NUCLEAR DETERRENCE in SOUTH ASIA: New Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace*. S.L.: Routledge.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Mansingh, Lalit. “Indo-US Strategic Partnership: Are We There Yet?” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2006. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09109>

²⁵ Ibid.

- ²⁶ Ahmed, Mansoor, "India's Nuclear Exceptionalism Fissile Materials, Fuel Cycles, and Safeguards," 2017, <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/India%27s%20Nuclear%20Exceptionali sm.pdf>
- ²⁷ "India, Pakistan and the NSG." n.d. Www.kcl.ac.uk. Accessed June 2, 2022. https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/india-pakistan-and-the-nsg#_ftnref12
- ²⁸ Clinton, Hillary. 2011. "America's Pacific Century." Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy. October 11, 2011. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/>
- ²⁹ Zhang, Li. 2016. "The China-India-USA Engagement in the Asia-Pacific: Security Implications for East Asian Regionalism." *China's Rise and Changing Order in East Asia*, 243–58. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-352-00023-8_14
- ³⁰ Ibid
- ³¹ Paul, Suman. "India's shift from Look East Policy to Act East Policy." *Elementary Education Online* 19, no. 2 (2021): 1366-1366.
- ³² Ahuja, Anil. "Prospects of India-US Defence Cooperation." *National Security* 4, no. 2 (2021): 139-153.
- ³³ "U.S.-India Joint Statement on the visit of Minister of Defence Manohar Parrikar to the United States."
- ³⁴ *Issue Brief on "India-US Military Agreement: BECA and its Implications for the Region"* 2020. *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*. [online] <https://issi.org.pk/issue-brief-on-india-us-military-agreement-beca-and-its-implications-for-the-region/>
- ³⁵ Ibid
- ³⁶ Minhas, Najma. 2020. *Pakistan's strategic options after Indo-US Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement?*. [online] Global Village Space, <https://www.globalvillagespace.com/pakistans-strategic-options-after-indo-us-basic-exchange-and-cooperation-agreement/>
- ³⁷ "INDO- PACIFIC STRATEGY of the UNITED STATES." 2022. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf>
- ³⁸ Ullah, Sufian and Zeeshan Hayat. "India as a Net Security Provider in Indo-Pacific and Implications for the Region." *NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability* 4, no. 1, 2021, 26-39. <https://njips.nust.edu.pk/index.php/njips/article/download/77/73/>
- ³⁹ "The National Security Committee in Its Meeting on 24 August 2017 Discussed the Trump Administration's South Asia Strategy – Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Mofa.gov.pk, 2017, <https://mofa.gov.pk/the-national-security-committee-in-its-meeting-on-24-august-2017-discussed-the-trump-administrations-south-asia-strategy/>
- ⁴⁰ Bukhari, Syed Shahid Hussain. 2021. *Pakistan's Security and the India-US Strategic Partnership Nuclear Politics and National Security*. London New York, Ny Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- ⁴¹ Qutab, Muhammad Waseem. "NSG Membership for India and Pakistan: Debating 'Critical' Aspects." *IPRI Journal* 19, no. 1 (2019): 1-29.

- ⁴² Basu, Nayanima, 2022. USAF secy needs Pentagon escort but Indian attaché doesn't — that's how deep India-US ties are. [online] The Print. <https://theprint.in/diplomacy/usaf-secy-needs-pentagon-escort-but-indian-attache-doesnt-thats-how-deep-india-us-ties-are/1085970/>
- ⁴³ "Exercise Tiger TRIUMPH." 2019. U.S. Embassy & Consulates in India. November 25, 2019. <https://in.usembassy.gov/tiger-triumph/>
- ⁴⁴ Copp, Tara. 2018. "INDOPACOM, It Is: US Pacific Command Gets Renamed." Defense News. May 30, 2018. <https://www.defensenews.com/news/your-military/2018/05/30/indo-pacom-it-is-pacific-command-gets-renamed/>
- ⁴⁵ Hanif, Sobia, and Muhammad Khan. "US Security Strategy for Asia Pacific and India's Role." *Strategic Studies* 38, no. 1 (2018): 1-20.
- ⁴⁶ United States Department of State. 2022. *Fourth Annual U.S.-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue - United States Department of State*. [online] Available at: <https://www.state.gov/fourth-annual-u-s-india-22-ministerial-dialogue/>
- ⁴⁷ Heiduk, Felix, and Gudrun Wacker. "From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: significance, implementation and challenges." (2020): 43.
- ⁴⁸ Huang, Cary. "Is Quad the First Step towards an Asian Nato?" South China Morning Post, November 25, 2017. <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2121474/us-japan-india-australia-quad-first-step-asian-nato>
- ⁴⁹ Cordesman, Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke, and Max Molot, "The Critical Role of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea," JSTOR, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22586.30?seq=1>
- ⁵⁰ "A Free Trade Agreement between Quad Nations: Vision or Reality?" n.d. Financialexpress. Accessed June 2, 2022. <https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/a-free-trade-agreement-between-quad-nations-vision-or-reality/2066170/>
- ⁵¹ "The People's Republic of China," United States Trade Representative. <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china>
- ⁵² Pettis, Michael. "How Trump's Tariffs Really Affected the U.S. Job Market." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. January 28, 2021. <https://carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarkets/83746>
- ⁵³ *India Armed Forces Joint Doctrine 2017: A Critical Appraisal*. IPRI - Islamabad Policy Research Institute. [online]. <https://ipripak.org/india-armed-forces-joint-doctrine-2017-a-critical-appraisal/>, March 15, 2018.
- ⁵⁴ Khattak, Masood Ur Rehman. 2020. "The Indian Army's Land Warfare Doctrine 2018: A Critical Analysis." *IPRI Journal* 20, no. 1.
- ⁵⁵ Kidwai, Khalid. "Strategic Stability and Nuclear Security: Global and Regional Perspectives." Center for International Strategic Studies, December 8, 2021.
- ⁵⁶ Global Times, "China-India Trade Hits Record High of \$126 Billion, up 43.3% Y-o-y despite Tension - Global Times," *Www.globaltimes.cn*, January 14, 2022, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1245968.shtml>
- ⁵⁷ Wezeman Pieter D., Alexandra Kuimova and Siemon T. Wezeman. "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2021" n.d. SIPRI. Accessed June 15, 2022. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/fs_2203_at_2021.pdf

⁵⁸ “India Decries ‘Biased’ US Report on Religious Freedom,” Aljazeera, June 3, 2022.
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/3/india-decries-biased-us-religious-freedom-report>

⁵⁹ LEE, LAVINA. “Assessing the Quad: Prospects and Limitations of Quadrilateral Cooperation for Advancing Australia’s Interests.” Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2020.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25090>

⁶⁰ “Aukus Pact Extended to Development of Hypersonic Weapons.” 2022. The Guardian. April 5, 2022.
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/apr/05/aukus-pact-extended-to-development-of-hypersonic-weapons>

⁶¹ “India Remains Divided about AUKUS.” n.d. Wwww.lowyinstitute.org.
<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-remains-divided-about-aukus>

⁶² Ibid.