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National Defence University
Islamabad, Pakistan

Book Title: The Security Imperative: Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrence and Diplomacy

Author: Zamir Akram

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Reviewed by Safia Malik is Research Officer at Center for International Strategic Studies Sindh (CISSS).

Pakistan has been facing security threats from India since independence. Zamir Akram's book focuses on Pakistan's nuclear deterrence and diplomatic efforts to deal with various security imperatives. The author has mentioned in the introduction that the book is largely based on his personal experience spanning over 38 years in the Pakistan Foreign Service, during which he served as Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN and other International Organizations in Geneva, Pakistan's Ambassador to Soviet Union, India, and the United States. The book is divided into fourteen chapters covering Pakistan's foreign policy including nuclear diplomacy from 1947 to 2020.

Author underlines Pakistan's security imperatives since 1947. He emphasized that Pakistan's geographical location, India's deep-rooted enmity with Pakistan and Indian aspiration for regional hegemony are the real causes of tension. India has outstanding disputes with all of its neighbours. It has used its size and military muscles to annex Sikkim, balkanise Bhutan, dominate Nepal and repeatedly interfere in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh. Even with more powerful China, New Delhi has laid claim to colonial-era borders which led to the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and continuing territorial disputes that perpetrated border clashes in 2020.

There is an emphasis on the Indian role in the dismemberment of East Pakistan in 1971 set the path for Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons. At the Multan Conference (1972), Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decided that nuclear capability was essential for national survival. India tested its first nuclear device in May 1974 and called it a "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)." The lukewarm international reaction to Indian nuclear explosion was deeply disappointing for Pakistan. In October 1974, the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during his visit to India reaffirmed that the US would continue to supply nuclear fuel to India's two General Electric Tarapur reactors, despite the Indian detonation using the US-supplied heavy water in the CIRUS reactors to produce the fuel for its nuclear bomb. French Atomic Energy Commission sent congratulations to its Indian counterparts.

The author traces Pakistan's journey of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and the role of PAEC. Three scientists played a crucial role in establishing nuclear research institutions and training manpower: (i) Dr Rafi Chaudhary, (ii) Dr Abdus Salam and (iii) Dr Nazir Ahmed who was the first Chairman of PAEC. PAEC established 5MW nuclear research reactor namely PARR-I at PINSTECH for research and development. The

discriminatory approach of Canada against Pakistan as it conditioned KANUPP (Karachi Nuclear Power Plant), funded by Canada, to be placed under the IAEA's safeguards, unlike India whose Canada supplied nuclear reactor **CANDU (Canada Deuterium Uranium)** was not required to be under such full-scope safeguards. India's acquisition of nuclear weapons under the umbrella of peaceful uses of nuclear technology was exposed by Munir Ahmed Khan, then serving at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna. He informed then Foreign Minister Bhutto and then President Ayub Khan that during his visit to India's CIRUS facility in 1964, he had seen himself that India was well on its way to making the bomb.

At the diplomatic level, Pakistan initiated a number of nuclear-related proposals in 1974 in United Nations and then in the Conference on Disarmament (CD): (i) Pakistan proposed the creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South Asia, a zone in Latin America and the Caribbean region in line with Treaty of Tlatelolco which prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of member states. The proposal received an overwhelming response from non-nuclear weapon states during UN meeting held in New York and Geneva. India opposed the proposal. Pakistan withdrew this resolution after conducting nuclear tests in May 1998 in response to Indian nuclear tests; (ii) Resolution on Negative Security Assurances which called upon all nuclear weapon states to extend security assurances that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. The resolution was supported by the majority of UN member states and members of CD including India. However, the French voted against it and the other nuclear weapon states, with the exception of China, voiced their reservation. This resolution continues to be sponsored by Pakistan; and (iii) Pakistan joined Sri Lanka's initiative to declare Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Despite highlighting Pakistan's concerns, these proposals were not successful. The author has emphasized that Pakistan had no choice but to develop its own programme. However, despite the CIA assessment that the KANUPP reactor had accumulated 200kg of reactor-grade plutonium by mid-1980s, which was enough nuclear material for 30-40 bombs, Pakistan decided to use its indigenously developed facilities for its nuclear weapons programme.

The US imposed sanctions on Pakistan through the Pressler Amendment. Pakistan took various diplomatic steps to deflect pressure on its strategic programme, which included: (i) Conclusion of a bilateral agreement with India in 1992 to not to acquire, develop, deploy or use chemical weapons. However, India was forced to acknowledge its secret possession of chemical weapons while becoming a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which proved that India had lied about the non-possession of chemical weapons when it signed the bilateral agreement with Pakistan five months ago; (ii) Creation of a Zero-Missile Zone in South Asia in 1993. This proposal was rejected by India; and (iii) Convening of a

Multilateral Conference on Security, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in South Asia in 1996. This proposal was rejected by India. The author has pointed out that globally Pakistan played a crucial role in the negotiation of the Chemical Weapon Convention at CD in 1993 leading to the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Pakistan also participated in the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 as part of the non-proliferation regime.

The author has highlighted Pakistan's position on CTBT and FMCT. Pakistan conveyed that unlike India it had voted in favour of the Treaty in the UN and supported it in CD. However, in view of its security concerns, Pakistan stated that it would sign the CTBT if India did so. On FMCT, Pakistan could agree to negotiations in CD provided the issue of asymmetry of fissile material stockpiles between India and Pakistan. In 1998 when India conducted its Pokhran II nuclear tests, Pakistan had to test its own nuclear weapons. On 28 May 1998, Pakistan conducted its five nuclear tests and one nuclear test on 30 May 1998 in response to the 1974 Indian nuclear test. Despite the nuclear tests, Pakistan continued its nuclear diplomacy. After the nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan proposed Strategic Restraint Regime to India that included: (i) Nuclear and missile restraint; (ii) Conventional balance; and (iii) Resolution of all disputes between India and Pakistan. The proposal did not materialize owing to Indian objections. However, it remains on table to date. To counter Indian war-fighting doctrines, the author has underscored that Pakistan has developed Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) to lower the nuclear threshold and ensure deterrence across the entire spectrum of threats. All these factors required that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine would need to be flexible and dynamic to maintain credible nuclear deterrence and strategic stability in the future. Pakistan established a robust command and control system under the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) as the secretariat of the National Command Authority (NCA).

The author has dedicated a chapter to Pakistan's connectivity and development. (i) Pakistan's geographical location can be turned into an opportunity rather than a challenge; (ii) CPEC can expand and upgrade the country's infrastructure and enhance energy production; and (iii) China-Pakistan partnership will not only boost the economic growth of the country but also provide access to the latest generation of civil and military technologies.